The vehicle has a reported range of 100 miles, of a 24kWh battery. If we assume the average U.S. emissions factor for electricity generation of 1.34 pounds per kilowatt hour, charging the battery has an implicit emission of 32 pounds, or 0.32 pounds per mile. In practice, a complete 24kWh charge will require about 20 percent more input energy because of battery cycle efficiency, voltage drops, and converter efficiency. Therefore, a reasonable emissions estimate is 0.38 pounds of carbon dioxide per mile.

Now, an 18 mile per gallon vehicle emits about a pound of carbon dioxide per mile – so we can see that the LEAF is equivalent to a gas-powered fossil fuel vehicle that gets about 47 mpg. The Toyota Prius hybrid already achieves 48MPG. And the Honda Insight, a conventional lightly hybrid vehicle, achieves 40MPG.

Using data from the DoE,  we can demonstrate how emissions efficiency vary by region. Note that these numbers are aggregates, and there will be significant regional variations.

State Equivalent Emissions rate

Average             45 mpg

California          98 mpg

Texas                41 mpg

Idaho           2,000 mpg (Idaho has minimal fossil fuel)

So we observe:

1) The vehicle has no tailpipe, but is capable of creating plenty of emissions elsewhere.

2) To impact emissions, the vehicle is most effective in low-carbon areas.

3) On average, hybrid vehicles are better – but this isn’t about averages. It is about cutting peaks.

4) Further deployment of renewable and nuclear energy will make electric cars much more attractive – in a few decades.

As noted, green isn’t easy.

The Commission notes that the computer manufacturers are now free to install any browser they choose – and they have to make a choice, even if they previously did not care. As I noted yesterday, IE is the easiest choice for them, and it is easy for their customers to load an alternative browser, if they care. But that approach will likely fail to satisfy the commission, given the content of the release.

The EU’s proposal of a ballot screen (actually, it seems to be Opera’s proposal) , which will force Microsoft to enforce a selection of alternative browsers through the PC manufacturers, is interesting but seems to fail certain tests of soundness. Who decides which browsers go on the screen and when can they be deleted? Can I write my own browser and demand that Microsoft include it? What about Lynx? Does Microsoft have to include contractual terms that force OEMs to buy competing software? Will there be dawn raids and secret agreements found in the shadows?

The economics of the technology business are tricky because of the rapid transition rates. Competition is defined by innovation as much as pricing. An innovative browser – if it offers material and meaningful advantages over the competition – will sweep thorough the market.

However, in the presence of competitor complaints, a dominant market share, and consumers that don’t seem to care, the Commission is struggling to find a sensible remedy. Now, was that ballot or bailout…

Microsoft has a simple, premeptive  answer: it will ship Windows without IE in Europe. Selling a computer without a browser is not practical, so the OEMs will have  to load a browser. Loading IE is probably the lowest cost path for the OEMs, there’s no need to explain to customers where the Internet went. But that seems to take us full circle, with the OEMs cast in the role of proxy market  manipulator. How the EU interprets Microsoft’s move will be interesting.

An implication of the EU position is that Europeans don’t really know where to find Chrome, Safari, Firefox or Opera on the Internet. The alternative interpretation – that they don’t really care – would not support an antitrust action.

The EU antitrust actions could be interpreted as trade barriers designed to shield local interests, based on the contrast between U.S. and EU antitrust practices. Such an interpretation is unthinkable right now, but political and economic conditions can change quickly.

We are set for some interesting activity on the antitrust front. Think about it as a cost of being too successful in Europe. And watch for changes in the U.S. approach

Note that technical superiority does not define success: execution of the business model is the primary determinant. Both the S/360 and the x86 architectures are cranky artifacts of the days when assembler was the only way to program, but they are two likely to stand through the next 20 years.

So, first, did I miss any architectures? The reasons for demise, and the ultimate resting place, of the retired architectures are interesting pointers for the future.

Then, which of the five current architectures are most likely to make it through 2020? I have my own ideas, but am interested in yours.