However, we did see a major change directly related to 9/11 on the federal, state and local government side. The formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in 2002 started the ball rolling. DHS/FEMA has done a very good job in maturing the readiness of federal, state, local and tribal nation emergency operations, but it has taken years for DHS/FEMA to have an impact on private sector BCM programs. The focus on improved public/private sector communications through multi-state and national-level exercises (especially for the healthcare, financial services and public utilities sectors), the introduction of Ready.gov, and the Voluntary Private Sector Preparedness Accreditation and Certification Program (PS-Prep) are three influential changes for private enterprises.

Even though 9/11 did not have an immediate impact on BCM maturity, it did set up the framework for preparedness, response and recovery improvements since for both the public and private sectors. The majority of these improvements have been a result of the confluence of three areas:

1. Increasing natural and man-made disaster events such as SARS, Hurricane Katrina, the bird and swine flu threats, the London and Mumbai bombings, the Iceland volcanic ash event, earthquakes in Haiti, Chile, New Zealand and Japan, oil spills, the global financial crisis of 2008, major ice and snow storms and so forth;
2. Technology innovations such as Internet broadband in the home, the real-time infrastructure, virtualization, hosting/outsourcing, smartphones and tablets, social media and cloud computing; and
3. Business operating practices such as regulatory changes in response to financial fraud, telework initiatives and outsourcing non-core competencies.

Without these changes to business and IT practices, many of the improvements we see today in BCM maturity would not be possible.

We have come a long way in BCM since 9/11 and we have a longer way to go for organizations of all sizes and operating models to be prepared from even the smallest, localized threat. Gartner is committed to your success in preparedness, response and recovery activities and continues to offer clients foundational and timely research in BCM and IT-DRM through our BCM key initiative for business and IT leaders. Take our maturity self-assessment called ITScore for Business Continuity Management to jump start your journey.

U.S again under threat

Published 9 September 2011

New York City and the District of Columbia respond to “specific, credible but unconfirmed” intelligence of an impending attack; information obtained indicates a vehicle-borne bomb; NYPD deploys boats, armored vehicles and a 1,000-member counter-terror force

As the nation prepares to commemorate the tenth anniversary of 9/11, New York City and Washington, D.C. again find themselves responding to an al Qaeda attack threat.

Federal authorities have advised local officials of a “specific, credible but unconfirmed threat” to the cities centered around the commemoration of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

The intelligence community has developed a “general description”of two or three individuals who may already be in the country. Making the effort more difficult is that the individuals in question have common names.

That intelligence came from the tribal region of Pakistan, from a source acknowledged as having a reliable record by U.S. intelligence officials.

It is believed that the attackers originated their journey in Afghanistan, with a possible third-country waypoint. That third country may have been Iran.

In the language of counter-terror officials, “specific” means that there is information of the type of attack that may occur. In this case, the information indicated that a vehicle-borne explosive device, a car- or truck-bomb, was the chosen method.

Last night, official focus was on two missing rental trucks, from different rental agencies in the Kansas City, Kansas area. They were later found and determined to be unconnected with the present threat.

“Credible” is used to indicate that the source of the information is believable, comes from a reliable, knowledgeable source. U.S. signals intelligence has been listening in on the communications of one particular al Qaeda source in Pakistan, from whom officials have gleaned confirmed information in the past.

Also supporting the credibility of the intelligence is an increase in “chatter” on the communication channels that are known to be used by al Qaeda operatives.

In the trove of documents gathered from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abottabad, Pakistan, during the raid that killed him, bin Laden showed a predilection for attacking the United States on significant dates and anniversaries, such as the upcoming 9/11 commemorations.

What has not yet been uncovered is the type of corroboration that would provide confirmation indicating that the plot is active and in progress.

New York City wasted no time in responding to the threat notification.

All bridges and tunnels entering Manhattan have been staffed with additional police and national guard personnel. Cars and trucks entering the city are being searched. Additionally, there have been checkpoints set up at various locations in Manhattan, such as Times Square and Lower Manhattan, approaching the financial district.

Key rail and subway stations operated by the Metropolitan Transit Authority, Port Authority of NY and NJ and NJ Transit have been staffed with additional officers accompanied by national guard troops, watching traffic outside stations and randomly searching backpacks and baggage inside.

New York City’s response has been thorough. Besides police officers at the bridges, tunnels and rail stations, the city has deployed radiation-detecting boats, cameras have been placed throughout midtown and lower Manhattan. If required, the NYPD has a small, unmanned submersible craft available to search the hulls of ships and boats.

Also deployed or on standby, is an “army” of 1,000 anti-terror officers, armored vehicles and weapons and EOD (explosive ordinance disposal) specialists.

Key Findings

• The earthquake and tsunami that struck the Tohoku district in March, and the power plant failures and other infrastructure problems that followed, continue to disrupt communications, transportation and other infrastructure.
• The Japanese government and Tepco have implemented a plan for rolling electrical blackouts across Tepco’s coverage area, designed to reduce power usage and avoid total power failures.
• These blackouts present serious challenges for Japanese enterprises, particularly in maintaining the operational integrity of their data centers and offering alternative system access to remote workers.

Tepco has said it will not carry out its planned rolling blackouts this summer, but electrical supply continues to present challenges for Japanese enterprises. Gartner has developed a set of best   practices for various scenarios and affected parties for IT organizations in Japan and worldwide. The appropriate response to the rolling blackout depends heavily on whether or not the enterprise’s data center has its own dedicated backup power generator.

Read more about the best practices – if you are an organization impacted by the earthquake/tsunami or not – in the full report by my colleagues  Masahiko Ishibashi, Eiichi Matsubara, Nagayoshi Nakano and Katsuo Hori.  Being a Gartner customer may be required.

The findings in this research are based on a joint Gartner and Business Continuity Institute (BCI) survey of business continuity management (BCM) consulting firms conducted during the first quarter of 2011. The survey objective was to better understand the breadth and depth of BCM service offerings. It was sent by BCI to its self-identified consultant membership and by Gartner to members on its BCM consultancy list that opted to participate. The survey closed on 4 March 2011.

Key Findings

• Many firms say they cover many BCM disciplines, but terminology varies across industries and countries, and so, misunderstandings are common.
• There is an increased need for consultants with specific skill sets:
  • Strategic program development
  • Tactical program improvements
  • Pragmatic, situation-based expertise
• A strong BCM program cannot be run by consultants alone. Therefore, BCM expertise must be brought in-house to ensure its continuing success.
• Due to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), consultant ranks have risen due to the layoffs of BCM professionals, and many of these people have taken jobs as consultants while waiting for a full-time BCM practitioner position.
• Fifty percent of BCM consultancies are small, with one to four full-time consultants onboard.
• Organization certification support is low — 13% of firms surveyed have BS 25999 Lead Auditor certification — in alignment with the existing low level of organizations that have such certification.
• Ninety-two percent of BCM consulting engagements are for planning services.
• Only one-quarter (24%) of BCM consulting firms offer a guarantee for services rendered.

Read the full report here: BCM Consultancy Survey, 2011. You may need to be a Gartner client to access the report.

The feedback from the organizations I met with pointed to a few classic problems in crisis and emergency management:

1) the lack of an authoritative source for accurate and timely information;

2) the lack of coordination regarding evacuations; and

3) the  lack of coordination regarding power shutdowns.

These problems caused 1) government web site overload from people seeking accurate information which then led to falsehoods being spread via social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, 2) gridlock out of Brisbane on January 11, 2011 after evacuation notices were sent to central district tenants, 3) organizations not being able to gracefully shutdown their data centers due to short notice of power shutdowns, and 4) confusion and frustration between the workforce and management – not every organization immediately issued an evacuation notice to their workforce. Compounding the tension were workforce communications problems due to the lack of Internet, cell phone and land line access as well as the lack of personnel on site on January 11, 2011 due to the northern area flooding where many people live – as one would expect, they stayed home to tend to their personal crises instead of coming to work.

On the positive side, the Queensland Police Service has been glowingly praised for countering the falsehoods being spread, including one that the Wivenhoe Dam would break and annihilate all of Brisbane.

All of the organizations I spoke with stood up their crisis command/emergency operations centers – many lost IT services for a few days, many were out of their production facilities for a few weeks and as mentioned previously, some lost their buildings for good. But all managed their way to recovery success and have returned to business as usual.

I will be publishing a more detailed report on these findings in the coming months, so watch for it on www.gartner.com.

Granted, excessive snow on roofs is a rather uncommon event (even in New England), and given the number of unique crises in 2010 and 2011 – volcanic ash and a government countrywide shut down of Internet and cell phone access to name just two, the risks facing BCM managers is growing and they are getting lots of great experience in treading new tracks (snow management tracks in this case). So the question is why did the Iron Mountain situation occur given the weeks of news reports of such events taking place?

The underlying reasons for this collapse have not been made public by Iron Mountain, but I can tell you that BCM service providers are a critical group of vendors that must be included in your supply chain availability risk management program. Not just from the planning perspective, but from the crisis management perspective as well. How many firms stood up their crisis command center and pro-actively reached out to their vendors since December/2010 to understand how they were handling the excessive snow and how secure their assets are and will be if the situation gets worse? Not many I’m sure. The 2009 H1N1 crisis was one situation where some firms did do such outreach.

Customers of every records management vendor, or any vendor that houses your organization’s assets, should understand in detail what are the vendor’s guarantees regarding the safeguarding of assets in unique circumstances such as excessive snow, and understand what recourse you have if they are damaged or if the situation is too risky for them to remain in their current facility. You should also require an annual assessment report of the vendor’s own BCM plan for the facility in which your assets are stored.

If you know of other such events for BCM service providers, if your firm has stood up their crisis command center this winter or have your own experience in these situations, we’d love to hear from you.

I’m wondering what tools your firm is using during such events? They have to be hosted by the vendor since your data center is down. What about Yammer, SocialCast, SocialText Signals, Sametime/LotusLive from IBM, Lync/BPOS from Microsoft, Google Apps? Is anyone using them or another tool for emergency purposes, and if so, how?