"If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” – If a piece of sensitive data is exposed to the intranet/LAN, is that a security incident?
Here are some versions of an answer I’ve heard (all fictionalized, of course):
- “No, what on Earth are you talking about? We share everything inside the firewall.”
- “No – since we would never know that it happened anyway.”
- “Yeah, kind of– but it is low-priority incident, the one we get to … whenever we get to it”
- “It depends on the data, some data seen outside its intended secure enclave immediately triggers an incident.”
- “Yes, of course - with 50,000 employees you cannot have any concept of a perimeter.”
- “Yes, because our internal is really external – due to a large number of partner, customer, vendor, etc personnel on our network.”
However, the situation is much worse than that. I am this close to thinking that today at a large company with expansive and effectively uncontrolled network access (wireless, VPN, BYOD, etc), an internal breach is going to become an external breach before you can say “DBIR”
Here is why: a lot of the organizations open up all sorts of internal resources to all sorts of outsiders and then poorly govern access to said resources. A recent research piece on SharePoint contained this shocking number: “nearly a third of these internal-facing SharePoint sites are now being opened up to people outside of the enterprise, such as partners and customers for external collaboration.” The authors further note, in a style reminiscent of a winning The Understatement of The Year contest entry, “This changes the overall risk profile of SharePoint.”
In this scenario, an internal exposure magically becomes a data breach. In light of this, some organizations undertook massive (=covering hundreds of thousands of internal file repositories and millions of files) efforts to discover, corral and attribute (to data owners) sensitive data and then institute a blend of processes and ongoing technical monitoring (via DLP) for internal exposures, in addition to explicit exfiltration and “loss.”
Finally, here is a great example (discovered here) of an internal incident leading to formal breach disclosure:
(full notification is at http://doj.nh.gov/consumer/security-breaches/documents/depository-trust-20120702.pdf)
So, here is to change in the New Year: accept an idea that an internal sensitive data exposure may, in fact, be a security incident, even before the attackers get to this data and steal it!
- On “Internally Lost Data” and DLP Discovery
- On Risks of DLP
- DLP and Data Classification
- DLP: Discover First or Monitor First?
- On DLP and PCI DSS
- On DLP and IP Theft
- DLP and/or/for/vs Data Security
- On DLP Processes or “No DLP For Dummies”
- On DLP Research
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