Andrew WhiteI am a Winston Churchill Fan – I have to admit. How can one not be – living in this glorious country that is the United States, where the only man to be awarded an honorary citizenship to the US, is so revered? I have read widely on the topic of WWII, and much about the nature of conflict and political relationships. I have read Churchill’s history of the war – and one really has to in order to make an estimate of the man. But I have read more than this – and this helps provide a richer view of the period, the man, and the perception.
A couple of weeks ago I kept back, from the weekend edition of the FT (September 6th) a write up called, “Man of War” (part of the Life and Arts section), since it was a summary or extract from a new book on Churchill, making the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of WWII. The fact that the paper had a picture of Churchill on the front page caught my eye; the fact that the article was about a new book on Churchill was enough to ensure I kept the paper to read at a later, quieter time. That time was this evening. I will not be purchasing the book.
I found the article had weaknesses that I did not agree with. Though the author very politely argues that he is not looking for ghouls or ghosts in Churchill’s life, he clearly hides behind a false premise. Here are a couple of examples that turned my eye:
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On sending troops (additional to the British Expeditionary Force) to help with the defense of France: “…for reinforcing failure by sending more troops to France in June [which] represented the his biggest, yet least noticed, mistake of 1940.”
After reading enough history that explains the long and sometimes tortuous relationship between France and England, coupled with an understanding of the stresses that Churchill, and others, were under when our natural enemy/ally was facing its darkest hour, one does not describe the effort this nation undertook as a “mistake”. It was an effort that needed to be taken; if England could have helped enough, or resourced what was necessary, to save France, it would have. It could not, and yet an effort had to be undertaken. At the darkest hour Churchill even came close to Union between France and England. There was no mistake here; there was a painful, gut wrenching, blood letting affirmation of a commitment.
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On fighting the Germans in the first place: “Britain had not the smallest chance of winning the war in the absence of American participation, which remained unlikely. Yet Churchill and his supporters believed that the consequences of accepting defeat were so absolute that that it was essential to fight on. This conviction, however admirable, demands a suspension of reason that some important people could not achieve. Captain Ralph Edwards, director of Naval Operations at the Admiralty, wrote in his diary on June 23: “Our Cabinet with that idiot Winston in charge changes its mind every 24 hours…”
The second item just makes me think the book is a waste of time. The article is not even well written. The first party seems to reinforce that Churchill was resolute; yet some lesser known executive is quoted referring to some, as yet, unknown wavering. So the paragraph does not add up.
History again sides with Churchill. The British Empire was in decline; and Churchill understood this. The free people of the west would not win without with America. America had little choice, even if it felt it had at the time, to avoid its role as banker (primarily). But more than that (and I hope I speak true), there is just too much consistency in the two nations beliefs – so if the roles were reversed, the same outcome would have taken place. So defeat was likely without our Brothers. But resolution, history, and determination, showed that again and again, England could survive. Churchill’s timing was perfect.
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…Churchill’s strategic problems began in earnest after the 1940 crisis passed and the Battle of Britain was won. What could the nation do next? …He was always looking around for “finest hours’ and if was not immediately available, his impulse was to manufacture one.”
I have read many books on the Mediterranean aspect of the war, and with only a little history and knowledge on one’s side, the importance of taking the war to Germany and to protecting what was left of the British Empire, it is easy to see why the only option was there. It was not a manufactured “finest hour”. It could have, and nearly was, a disastrous period (remember Crete; hardships on Malta). II would recommend “Hitler’s Mediterranean Gamble” by Douglas Porch, Cassell, 2004, for a recent and excellent understanding of the importance of this region for the whole war.
I find the authors attempt at re-coloring what happened in a negative light unhelpful and not adding to the knowledge base that we have for the period, or the man (Churchill). Understanding WWII is a complex task; understanding the men that influenced events more so. I believe that Churchill may have made mistakes; as all men do. But I also believe that those mistakes (which this article does not uncover) are easily drowned in the goodness that came from his leadership. Am I biased? Perhaps. But I am proud to be so. I hope for a better book on Churchill – alas it won’t be from this author (Max Hastings).
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